Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — the most consequential military conflict
Europe has witnessed since the Second World War — has riveted the attention of
the world. Observers have grappled with the meaning of the act of aggression
and scrambled to ponder the wider implications of the war. Almost inevitably
people look to draw analogies—both historical and contemporary ones.
Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine — the most consequential military conflict Europe has witnessed
since the Second World War — has riveted the attention of the world. Observers
have grappled with the meaning of the act of aggression and scrambled to ponder
the wider implications of the war. Almost inevitably people look to draw
analogies—both historical and contemporary ones.
Taiwanese helicopters fly
the country’s flag through the capital Taipei. October 5, 2021. (Lam Yik
Fei/The New York Times)
One popular
contemporary analogy is between Russia’s actions vis-à-vis Ukraine and China’s
approach to Taiwan. Beyond some broad-brush parallels — the most obvious
parallel being that both Ukraine and Taiwan are peace-loving democracies that
are the objects of belligerent irredentism on the part of more militarily
powerful and threatening neighboring autocracies — there are also significant differences.
Xi Jinping’s China is not Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and Taiwan is not Ukraine.
China Is Not Russia
Russia under Putin
has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to
a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as
well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most
recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president).
Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these
same countries and others.
Although China has
also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders
in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations. Around its
periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent
clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions,
invasions or occupations of other countries since it invaded Vietnam in 1979.
China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have
been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has more than
20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one
official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of
other facilities it does not formally acknowledge.
Of course, Beijing
has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus
within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political
dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these
operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has
also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive
instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in
remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with
India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years,
China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the
disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of
Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.
Putin appears to
relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb
his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date — has
mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times
he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less
meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a
lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international
efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive
great power. Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and
aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s
leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Putin, by contrast,
has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership
beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and
has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the
prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the
EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic
activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve
China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a
security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and
four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of
some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa.
However, Moscow’s
most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen
Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that
their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship —
which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the
defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian
relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent
years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States
have deteriorated.
Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not
want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with
Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its
statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace
but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its
military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and
Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter
Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly
abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s
invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the
Olympics.
Russia’s invasion
poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to
Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on
China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict
China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other
countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good
customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI
cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship
between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in
Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative.
Taiwan Is Not Ukraine
The fact that Ukraine
is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost
certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s
commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to
contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any
lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful
member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send
military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration
has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide
robust military assistance to Ukraine.
By contrast, Xi and
his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute
support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army — as
all branches of China’s armed forces are known — continues to assume that if it
launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively
intervene. The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to
the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, the
Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and
national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment.
It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military
attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a
war with the United States.
However, there is
no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense
pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is
Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship
with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S.
administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against
Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there
is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits
the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the
island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists.
While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most
significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military
leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a
de facto alliance with Taiwan.
China’s increased
military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan
Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served
to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch
democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan
against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with
China.
However, Taiwan,
unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has
ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including
China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with
approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks
to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington,
and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide
network of de facto diplomatic missions.
Although Ukraine’s
diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s
military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO,
although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative.
While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close
and consequential security partners, most notably the United States.
China Is China and Taiwan
Is Taiwan
Taiwan continues to
be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan
Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military
confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo
colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a “core”
national interest of China’s, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that “resolving the Taiwan question
and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an
unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China” and that “no one should
underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to
defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Moreover, most
Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as
something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with
China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from
becoming de jureindependent. Beijing’s preferred means of realizing unification
or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use
of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA’s central warfighting scenario is Taiwan
and China’s military has been focused on planning and preparing for an
operation against the island for decades.
A Cautionary Tale?
The above
differences notwithstanding, Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine will have a
spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces
remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face
a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow
Politburo members pause. If Russia’s military experiences major setbacks and
perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China’s political leaders
think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan.
After all, an
invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is
geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with
mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a
far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and
coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also
involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an
even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous
terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia’s Ukrainian campaign
and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major
powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China’s
armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese
forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign
since 1950 (against Hainan Island).
One way that
China’s leadership might be taking notes from Russia’s Ukraine invasion is by
rethinking the risks associated with escalation. In addition to noting the
potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, China might be wary of
the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China
were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the
possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is
experiencing anemic growth and structural challenges.
In particular, the
weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has
been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission
system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but
neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders. Despite
its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial
transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be
devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in
blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a
resolute collective response by NATO member countries.
In any event, at
present Xi and his Politburo colleagues display little sense of urgency about
realizing unification with Taiwan via military means and there is no indication
of a massive Chinese military buildup in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. Of
course, Beijing’s calculus vis-à-vis the use of force against Taipei can
change, so the world must continually monitor the situation and remain alert to
warnings and indicators. Part of this monitoring must include scrutinizing
Chinese assessments of Russia’s performance in Ukraine in the coming weeks,
months and years.